Protect admin token from container workspace #26

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pti merged 4 commits from feat/admin-auth-boundary into main 2026-07-23 12:49:14 +02:00
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Reject enabled admin-token paths resolving inside writable workspaces, including direct, symlinked, missing, and dangling paths. Verified with go test ./... and go vet ./... .

Reject enabled admin-token paths resolving inside writable workspaces, including direct, symlinked, missing, and dangling paths. Verified with go test ./... and go vet ./... .
fix(up): protect admin token from containers
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92c2fa938c
Reject admin token paths that resolve within a writable workspace before starting the server or container.
fix(up): normalize admin token boundary paths
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29825a684b
Expand home-relative paths before the workspace check and cover allowed external token targets.
test(up): cover symlinked token parent
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816ee142b2
fix(up): validate disabled admin tokens
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e0588ae0a1
Token provisioning is unconditional, so reject configured admin token paths under writable workspaces even when the UI is disabled.
pti merged commit f8ab188c38 into main 2026-07-23 12:49:14 +02:00
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